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NEWLY AVAILABLE, NOT NEWLY DISCOVERED
Penny J. White*
At about the same time that the United States Supreme
Court was deciding that state time limits for requesting a new
trial based on newly discovered evidence did not violate due
process, scientific evidence was emerging that should force
courts to rethink the rigid application of limitation periods in
serious criminal cases.' The purpose of this essay is to explore
that phenomenon and suggest methods by which appellate courts
may approach its fair resolution.
I. HERRERA V. COLLINS
Six years ago, in Herrera v. Collins,' the United States
Supreme Court held that due process was not violated when a
state refused to consider newly discovered evidence in a capital
case eight years after conviction. The case arose in Texas, where
state law imposed a thirty-day time limit for filing motions for
new trial based on newly discovered evidence. The newly
* Visiting Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law; former Justice,
Tennessee Supreme Court; Judge, Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals; Judge, Tennessee
Circuit Court for the First Judicial District.
1. The recent revelation that the guilt of convicted defendants, including some on death
row, has been refuted or substantially questioned by newly-available DNA test results has
generated greater public awareness of the potential for conviction of the innocent by a criminal
justice system subject to human error. See, e.g., JIM DwYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE:
FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED
(2000) (detailing ten cases of convicted defendants ultimately released due to discovery of
evidence of their actual innocence); Alan Berlow, The Wrong Man, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Nov. 1999, at 66, 68 (noting that more than eighty death row inmates have been freed from
prison since death penalty reinstated in 1976 based on evidence of innocence, a number
equivalent to 15% of those executed in the same period); Margaret Carlson, Death, Be Not
Proud: Nothing is as Certain as the Pace of Executions In Bush's Texas, TIME, Feb. 21, 2000,
at 38 (noting "[thirteen people scheduled for death in Illinois had been exonerated" in
commenting on moratorium on executions imposed by Illinois Governor George Ryan).
2. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
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discovered evidence was affidavits of witnesses which, if
believed, established the actual innocence of the condemned
defendant.
Emphasizing that due process "does not require that every
conceivable step be taken, at whatever cost, to eliminate the
possibility of convicting an innocent person," 3 the Court denied
Herrera relief from the time limit imposed by Texas law. Such
motions, filed under state law, were grounded in long tradition
that required their filing within a short period of time after trial.
Therefore, the Texas time limit did not transgress principles of
fundamental fairness and justice.
4
II. MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL'
At the time Herrera was decided, only nine states did not
limit the time within which a new trial motion could be filed.6
Thus, the majority of the states imposed time limits for the filing
of a motion for new trial varying between ten days and three
years.7 This approach is consistent with the historical disfavoring
of motions for new trials, particularly those based on newly
discovered evidence.
The historical aversion to motions for new trial is justified
by the motion's limited purpose. A motion for new trial provides
the trial judge the opportunity to correct legal errors that
occurred during the trial. Because the grounds for the motion in
3. Ie at 399 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 208 (1977)).
4. Id. at411.
5. While this essay focuses on issues relative to limitation periods for motions for new
trials, its arguments are also applicable to statutes of limitations for the filing of post-
conviction and habeas petitions.
6. Those states were California, Colorado, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and West Virginia. Georgia's 30-day time
limit can be extended as can Idaho's 14-day limit. Oregon's 5-day limit, Iowa's 45-day
limit, Ohio's 120-day limit, and Kentucky's one year limit can each be waived.
7. Sixteen states have limits of 60 days or less. These states are Alabama, Arizona,
Arkansas, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin. One state, Mississippi, requires that the
filing be made during the term in which the judgment is rendered. Seventeen states and the
District of Columbia have filing periods between one and three years. These states are
Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Vermont,
Washington, and Wyoming.
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most cases are what transpired during trial and therefore, is
known to counsel at the end of trial, no need exists for any
substantial delay in filing the motion.
As is true of all limitation periods, policy reasons have
traditionally supported the strict application of deadlines for the
filing of motions for new trial. In the criminal context, the most
pressing of those policy reasons is the government's legitimate
interest in finality. After trial resulting in a conviction, the
presumiption of innocence has dissolved and been replaced with
a presumption of guilt. While the convicted may have the right
to meaningful appellate review or a new trial if certain errors
have occurred, prolonging the time period in which those events
transpire fulfills no legitimate individual interest and disserves
the important interest in the finality of judgments. Additionally,
the government has a legitimate interest in carrying out
punishment in order to promote respect for the law and its
procedures.
Other policy considerations favoring the strict application
of limitation periods are more applicable in the civil context, but
are nonetheless instructive. Limitation periods promote accurate
and expeditious fact finding while witnesses' memories are fresh
and evidence is available. They also alleviate surprise and
encourage parties to be diligent about pressing their rights.'
Despite the importance of these policy considerations, not
all motions for new trial are based solely on events that
transpired during trial, easily presented within days of the
rendering of the verdict. Some, for example, involve later
discoveries of improprieties, such as the use of perjured
testimony or the suppression of exculpatory evidence.9 Still
other motions for new trial may be based, not on what happened
in the courtroom nor on later discoveries of trial improprieties,
but rather on the discovery of new evidence that might have
affected the determination of guilt.
8. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979); Order of R.R. Telegraphers v.
Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944).
9. In these two particular contexts, the Supreme Court has responded to the unfairness
that would result if the presentation of the issue were barred by time limitations and has'
found both the use of perjured testimony and the withholding of exculpatory evidence to
violate the due process clause. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (perjured
testimony); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (exculpatory evidence).
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III. MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL BASED ON
NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE
Though difficult to accomplish, a motion for new trial
based on newly discovered evidence will be granted if the new
evidence is discovered after trial, the defendant by exercise of
due diligence could not have discovered the evidence during
trial, the evidence is material and is not merely cumulative, or
impeaching evidence, and most critically, the evidence would
probably produce a different verdict if offered in a new trial.W°
For new trial motions based on newly discovered evidence, strict
time limits are also imposed, based upon the same policy
considerations that support limitation periods in general. While
the grounds for the motion may be unknown for some time, so
that a party could not legitimately be accused of "sleeping on
his or her rights," the other policy considerations of finality and
accurate and expeditious fact finding, on balance, tip the scales.
Thus, motions for new trial based on newly discovered evidence
are said to be disfavored with the burden for establishing
entitlement resting on the defendant and said to be far greater
than the burden on a defendant moving for new trial on other
grounds.
Notably, the policy considerations supporting strict
adherence to limitation periods was among the reasons
supporting the Court's decision in Herrera.' Despite Herrera's
claim that he was not guilty and his offer of testimony to prove
his innocence, the Court observed that a later determination of
guilt or innocence would not likely be more "exact" given that
the "erosion of memory and dispersion of witnesses...
diminish the chances of a reliable criminal adjudication." 12 But
10. This general description of the grounds for a new trial based on newly discovered
evidence is consistent, for example, with the federal rules approach in both the civil and
criminal context. FED. R. CRIM. P. 33 (two-year limitation period for newly discovered
evidence); FED. R. CIV. P. 59, 60(b)(one-year limitation period for newly discovered
evidence).
11. It is, of course, recognized that the case was a habeas corpus case in which issues of
finality are much more pronounced than they are at the motion for new trial phase of a
case. Additionally, and as obvious as the first caveat, habeas courts ensure only that the
Constitution is not violated and do not sit to correct issues of fact.
12. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 403-04 (quoting McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467,
491 (1991)); see Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 453 (1986)(plurality opinion).
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what if the evidence that the court is urged to consider on a
motion for new trial does not involve eroded memories or
dispersed witnesses, but is instead described as exacting and
most reliable? What if it consists of evidence that does not
change over time, that cannot be altered with a vigorous cross-
examination, that will establish the same fact twenty years from
judgment as it would have at the time of judgment? What if the
-evidence is not newly discovered evidence, but newly available
evidente due to the advance of technology?
Further, should courts apply the same test to newly
available evidence as is applied to newly discovered evidence,
particularly when this evidence, although highly reliable, cannot
meet the requirements of the test? It is, after all, not newly
discovered. It existed in some form at the time of trial, but is
only now capable of being converted into probative evidence. It
is not newly discovered, but newly available as a result of
technological advances. And finally, should requests for relief
based on this newly available evidence be subjected to the harsh
time limitations generally applicable to newly discovered
evidence?
IV. APPLICATION TO NEWLY AVAILABLE DNA EVIDENCE
The technological advances that have produced exacting
DNA evidence pose all of these problems. At about the time the
Supreme Court was affirming the denial of Herrera's claim,
courts were grappling with the admissibility of so-called new
DNA evidence. In the early years of DNA testing, the testing
provided some narrowing of suspects, but often yielded
erroneous results. Courts concerned with the reliability of DNA
evidence often excluded it. In the last ten years, however, DNA
technology has significantly advanced to more discriminating
methods. "The introduction of DNA profiling has
revolutionized forensic science and the criminal justice system
[and gives] courts a means of identifying... perpetrators...
with a high degree of confidence." 3
Modern-day DNA evidence as such is much more capable
13. Walter Rowe, Commentary, in CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE:
CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL
xv (1996).
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of definitively excluding potential suspects and exonerating
wrongfully convicted defendants. 4 But before the evidence can
play this significant role in assuring a fundamentally fair
criminal justice system, it must be admissible. Given the long-
standing disfavor of motions for new trial based on newly
discovered evidence, the strict proof requirements placed upon
the defendant, and the limited time periods available for raising
such claims, a substantial likelihood exists that defendants who
have been wrongfully convicted, but whose time periods for
filing for new trials based on newly discovered evidence have
lapsed, will not be able to establish their innocence in court.
Thus the enthusiastic welcome of DNA technology as a
means of convicting the guilty and exonerating the innocent "by
science" is not without challenges for America's courts. No one
can seriously question that reliable methods for excluding
potential suspects as well as identifying perpetrators should be
embraced by the courts. But what about the thousands of cases
in which the courts have already acted, in which the strict time
limits for motions for new trial or for post-conviction or habeas
petitions have long since passed? Will courts allow age-old
precepts of appellate review to forestall efforts of exoneration
brought belatedly by the wrongfully convicted?
The challenge of how to deal with newly available
evidence will largely fall on the appellate courts. The strict time
periods for filing motions for new trial based on newly
discovered evidence in most jurisdictions will deny the already-
convicted defendant the opportunity to establish innocence.
Routinely, and correctly perhaps, the trial courts will dismiss
time-barred motions or petitions based upon limitation periods.
The lower court will have determined when the limitations
period began to run, usually on the date of verdict or judgment,
and when the motion or petition was filed. Based on those
factual findings, the trial court will have concluded, by simple
mathematics, that the motion is beyond the limitations period
14. According to Federal Bureau of Investigation officials, twenty-five percent of the
suspects have been excluded by forensic DNA testing every year since 1989 in sexual
assault cases referred to the FBI and in which DNA results could be gathered. Private labs,
according to the National Institute of Justice, have noted about a twenty-six percent
exclusion rate during the same time period. Peter Neufeld & Barry Scheck, Commentary,
in CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA
EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL xxviii (1996).
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and therefore, barred. The case will come to the appellate court
with a presumption of correctness as to the trial judge's factual
findings, allowing reversal only upon an offense of discretion.
Undoubtedly, a trial judge who dismisses a late-filed petition has
not abused his or her discretion. Thus, the appellate court will be
in a perfect posture to summarily affirm the dismissal.
Or perhaps, the trial court not faced with a limitations
problem will find that DNA evidence was available at the time
of the trial. After all, the fluid from which the DNA sample
could have been derived was left at the scene. Thus, a trial judge
could find that the evidence was not newly discovered because it
was in existence before the trial. Again, this factual finding
would bear the presumption of correction on appeal, barring the
appellate court from offering relief unless the finding
represented an abuse of discretion.
The real issue that must be resolved will then rest with the
appellate courts. Is the newly discovered evidence formulation
the correct one when the evidence is newly available DNA
profiling evidence? Because of the trial court's obligation to find
facts and apply law, it is unlikely, and perhaps inappropriate,
that the matter be resolved at that level. When properly
presented, however, the appellate court must resolve these
issues. Should evidence in existence at the time of trial, but not
capable at that time of yielding probative evidence, be subjected
to the newly discovered evidence test? Should that same
evidence be barred due to limitation periods when that evidence
can today, as a result of advancing technology, exonerate the
convicted?
V. ANALOGOUS RESPONSES
Arguably, motions for new trial based on newly available
DNA evidence should not be subjected to the strictures of the
newly discovered evidence rule. The purposes of the
strictness-finality, fairness, and accurate and expeditious
disposition of claims-are not met by suppressing newly
available DNA evidence of actual innocence. Additionally,
allowing the evidence does not defeat those purposes. The fear
of failing memories and lost evidence that prompts the strict
time limits is inapplicable in the DNA context. The only
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governmental interest that is served by adhering to the
demanding requirements is finality. Surely finality and
quickness must take a back seat to fairness and accuracy. The
challenge for appellate courts is to determine how to assure that
fundamental fairness prevails over procedural rigidity.
Fortunately, appellate judges need not write on a blank
slate. Courts have responded creatively in other legal contexts
when strict adherence to time limits seemed to beget unfairness.
One of the earliest examples of judicial response aros in a
worker's injury case in which the plaintiff had contacted
silicosis.'5 Though a strict application of the statute of limitations
had resulted in the dismissal of plaintiffs case, the United States
Supreme Court construed the accrual of the claim to be at the
time of manifestation and diagnosis of the disease that was much
later than the time of contact'6 This manipulation of limitation
periods, now commonly known as the delayed discovery rule,
has been extended to civil cases involving professional liability,
products liability, and other torts.17
Most recently, the application of the delayed discovery rule
has been urged in civil and criminal cases against the
perpetrators of sexual offenses.'8 In the civil context, application
of the delayed discovery rule is justified when injuries resulting
from child sexual offenses do not fully manifest until adulthood
or when, as a result of repressed memory or other psychological
disorders caused by the sexual abuse, the victim is incapable of
recognizing the full nature of the injuries until much later.' 9
Thus, the limitation period should accrue then, rather than at the
time of the offenses.
In criminal cases, the concerns are different. The statutes of
limitations are intended to limit cases to a time period in which
15. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
16. Id. at 170. Plaintiff in the words of the Court was in "blameless ignorance" of his
injury until it manifested itself and was diagnosed. Id.
17. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 120, at
889-96 (5th ed. 1984).
18. For the purposes of this writing, sexual offenses include sexual penetration or
sexual contact against a child or adult.
19. The delayed discovery doctrine has historically only been used to toll statutes of
limitations for plaintiffs under the theory that a balance of the interests of a blameless
plaintiff (who misses the otherwise applicable statute of limitations) and the interests of a
defendant in not having to defend against a civil action weighs in favor of the plaintiff.
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the evidence is fresh and to encourage prosecutors, police, and
the courts to proceed in a timely manner so as not to affect
defendants' ability to mount a defense. 0 Additionally, the
limitation periods protect the one-time criminal who has become
rehabilitated from a continual torment regarding whether the one
transgression will result in a charge. Thus, in a criminal case, a
limitation period is to be "liberally interpreted in favor of
repose" 2 and begins when "the crime is complete."22
Nevertheless, some courts have stretched limitation periods
in criminal sexual offenses cases by construing the crimes as
"continuing" in order to toll the statute; others have tolled the
statute under the theory that the threat or coercion
accompanying the criminal act served to conceal the crime. 3 In
other efforts to assure the prosecution of those accused of sexual
offenses, legislatures have acted to either extend the time period
24or provide for tolling of the statute under certain circumstances.
Thus, it is clear that courts (and legislatures) have
creatively responded to harsh limitation periods in
circumstances when response seemed essential to accomplishing
justice, at least justice as perceived by the civil plaintiff and
victims of sexual offenses. No less response is due when the
harsh limitation period extinguishes the ability of a convicted
person sentenced to life imprisonment or death to establish
actual innocence.
VI. SOME RESPONSIBLE RESPONSES
A few state appellate courts confronted with the issue of
newly available DNA evidence have interpreted limitation
periods to provide for tolling in order to avoid a miscarriage of
20. See Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114-15 (1970).
21. United States v. Scharton, 285 U.S. 518, 522 (1932).
22. Pendergast v. United States, 317 U.S. 412, 418 (1943).
23. See generally Gary M. Emsdorff & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Let Sleeping Memories
Lie? Words of Caution About Tolling the Statute of Limitations in Cases of Memory
Repression, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 129, 143-54 (1993).
24. The most common circumstance is the acquiring of the age of majority. Other
circumstances commonly used by legislatures to toll the statute are those in which the
nature of the abuse is not discovered until a later time or is concealed due to fear, threat, or
coercion.
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justice." Others have refused to do so. 2 At least one court has
found a state constitutional basis for allowing a defendant a
hearing on a late claim of actual innocence, although relief was• 27
denied in the case in which the right was recognized. Thus, one
option for appellate courts is to construe accrual to occur upon
discovery that DNA evidence was secured in the case and
remains available. Under this approach, defendants who were
convicted before the more exacting DNA methods were
available would have a reasonable time after learning that DNA
evidence was secured in their case to file a motion for
consideration of the evidence. Because defendants who protest
their innocence would welcome the opportunity to exonerate
themselves, little delay in learning of the existence of DNA
evidence should be expected. Another approach would be to
determine when the exacting methods of testing became
available in the jurisdiction and to make that the date of accrual.
In other states, the legislature has reacted, often with court
prompting, to create extended limitation periods in forensic
25. See, e.g., New York v. Callace, 573 N.Y.S.2d 137, 139 (Suffolk County Ct. 1991)
(post-conviction court, holding that newly-available DNA evidence would fit within a statutory
definition of newly discovered evidence); In re Dabbs, 570 N.Y.S.2d 765, 768 (Sup. Ct. 1990)
(granting motion for discovery in post-conviction process to permit DNA testing).
Similarly, in New Jersey v. Thomas, 586 A.2d 250, 252 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1991), the court held that although defense counsel had not moved for DNA testing prior to
trial, this decision did not amount to procedural default because DNA evidence had not
previously been ruled admissible in New Jersey and the defendant was unable to bear the cost
of testing. Where the prosecution's case was weak and defendant advanced a credible alibi at
trial, the court noted the the potential exculpatory value of newly-available scientific evidence
and concluded:
And we can conceive of no greater injustice, when that evidence is available, of
depriving a convicted defendant of access to it. The prosecutor, the court, and
the judicial system have an obligation to protect the innocent which is no less
fundamental than the obligation to punish the guilty.
Id at 252; see also Sewell v. Indiana, 592 N.E.2d 705, 708 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (holding in
post-conviction proceedings that defendant was entitled to discovery of the "rape kit" in the
State's possession to permit DNA testing because prosecution's case at trial "weak" or
susceptible to reasonable doubt and critical evidence establishing guilt or innocence could be
made available to resolve claims of wrongful conviction).
26. Virginia, which has a twenty-one day limitations period for motions for new trial
executed James O'Dell in July 1997, despite his claims of actual innocence after the
Governor rejected his request for DNA testing. Pope John Paul II, Mother Teresa, and the
president of Italy had joined those requesting that the test be done.
27. Graham v. Texas Board of Pardons & Paroles, 913 S.W.2d 745, 751 (Tex. Ct. App.
1996) (holding that "Graham's right to a due course of law hearing on his claim of actual
innocence has been satisfied by the habeas corpus procedure").
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testing cases.2 ' Because appellate courts most often draft their
own procedural rules, modified rules extending limitation
periods in cases involving newly available DNA evidence could
be proposed and adopted.29 If the procedural requirements are
statutory, courts could suggest appropriate statutory
amendments.
While some courts have preferred to leave the issue to the
attorney general, reopening cases upon agreement by the
pr6secuion, to do so shirks a judge's responsibility to "act at all
times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
integrity... of the judiciary."30
VII. CONCLUSION
Appellate judges faced with the appeals of dismissals of
late-filed motions for new trial based on newly available DNA
evidence have an obligation to assess whether adherence to
long-standing principles applicable to such motions is
appropriate when the evidence is not newly discovered in the
traditional sense, but rather newly available as a result of recent
technological advances. In those cases in which the evidence
could actually exonerate a wrongfully convicted defendant, strict
28. Georgia statutorily allows for the filing of a motion for new trial after the expiration
of the thirty-day time period if some good cause is shown why the motion was not made
during the time period. GA. CODE ANN. § 5-5-41 (1999). Even when a previous motion has
been made, a late motion will be entertained if it is "extraordinary," which particularly
applies to "events that do not ordinarily occur in the transaction of human affairs." Cade v.
Georgia, 129 S.E.2d 405, 406 (Ga. Ct. App. 1962). New York has a forensic testing statute
for convictions occurring before January 1, 1996, which allows DNA testing if the court
determines that a "reasonable probability that the verdict would have been more favorable
to the defendant" exists. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 440.30 (McKinney 1999). The New
York courts, however, have imposed a due diligence requirement for filing under the
statute. See New York v. Kellar, 218 A.D.2d 406, 410 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996). Illinois has a
similar provision. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT 5/116-3 (West Supp. 2000).
29. See Mark Hansen, DNA Bill of Rights, A.B.A. J., Mar. 2000, at 30 (noting that 62
people have been freed from prison in the past decade based on DNA test results demonstrating
their actual innocence of offenses for which they were convicted). Senator Patrick Leahy, D-
Vt., has introduced legislation which would require procedures for DNA testing for convicted
federal defendants and encourage states to develop similar procedures. Innocence Protection
Act of 2000, S. 2073, 106th Cong., 2d Sess. (2000).
30. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2A.
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time limitations should not impede the courts from
accomplishing justice.
